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have suggested, were not intended to be the enactment's essence;"'
the duty of the courts and administrative agencies under NEPA was
arguably designed to be a substantive one: to insure, through careful
analysis, that "important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls
of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the
federal bureaucracy" 28-to insure, in short, that NEPA's vital goals
do not remain unattained-and unattainable.
The Stryckers' Bay Court has constructed a model of statutory
compliance with NEPA that leaves these laudable goals as merely
empty aims; and the Court has deprived these aims of realization by
undermining the juridical definition of NEPA as a statutory direc-
tive which compels the substantive, analytic implementation of
NEPA's objectives. The remnants of this decision are emasculated
procedural, judicial, and administrative processes as well as a persis-
tent legal query: Are solely procedural processes sufficient to bridge
the gap between the aims of NEPA-and their reification?
John Milkovich
A FUNCTIONAL PURPOSE FOR COMPARING FAULTS:
A SUGGESTION FOR REEXAMINING "STRICT LIABILITY"
While working in a dimly lighted area on an offshore drilling rig
owned by the defendant, the plaintiff was injured when he fell
through a hole on one level to the floor of the next level. In
plaintiff's suit against Dixilyn seeking recovery in strict liability1
based on Louisiana Civil Code article 2317,2 the trial judge in-
structed the jury as to the requirements of strict liability and also
as to the availability of contributory negligence as a defense.3 A jury
127. Id.
128. 449 F.2d at 1111.
1. The plaintiff also brought an action in negligence. The jury found the defen-
dant negligent, but also found the plaintiff contributorily negligent, thus barring
recovery. While the negligence action is not at issue in this appellate opinion, it does
provide an example of when, if contributory negligence is not allowed as a defense in
the strict liability action, the plaintiff may avoid a denial of recovery by bringing the
action under strict liability.
2. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2317: "We are responsible, not only for the damage occa-
sioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom we
are answerable, or of the things which we have in our custody. This, however, is to be
understood with the following modifications."
3. The instruction given to the jury provides in pertinent part: "'any negligence
on the part of the plaintiff which was a proximate cause of the accident bars the plain-
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verdict found that the requisite elements of strict liability were pre-
sent and also that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.' The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that under
Louisiana law ordinary contributory negligence' was not an availa-
ble defense to a strict liability action based on article 2317. Rodrigue
v. Dixilyn Corp., 620 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1980).
Under the current interpretation of Louisiana Civil Code article
2317, the owner or custodian of a thing is liable for the damage
caused by it, regardless of any lack of negligence on his part.'
However, this use of article 2317 is a relatively recent development
in Louisiana law. Traditionally, not only was 2317 interpreted as
only a transitional article with little substantive value,' but fault in
the form of negligence was required if liability was to be found
under article 2315 and the articles providing instances of fault which
follow it.' The Louisiana courts slowly repudiated the traditional ap-
proach in a series of cases" which developed a new concept of
tiff's recovery as a matter of law, even though the defendant may also be found to
have been negligent or at fault as the custodian of the rig in question."' 620 F.2d at
540 (emphasis in original).
4. The plaintiff's contributory negligence consisted of working in an area with in-
sufficient illumination. In order to arrive at the issue of the applicability of con-
tributory negligence, the court conceded that "[elvidence in the record may support
the jury finding." Id. at 539.
5. The court was careful to distinguish "ordinary contributory negligence" from
the contributory negligence that overlaps with assumption of the risk, "voluntary en-
countering a known unreasonable risk." See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 440-41 (4th ed.
1971).
6. See notes 16-21, infra.
7. For a concise statement of the traditional rules of interpretation of article
2317 and its surrounding provisions, see Comment, Tort Law in Louisiana-The Sup-
plementary Tort Articles 2317-2322, 44 TUL. L. REV. 119, 120 (1969).
8. The structure and placement of article 2317 between articles 2315 and 2316,
on one hand, and articles 2318 to 2322, on the other, as well as its vagueness and its
last sentence make article 2317 appear transitional. Tunc, Louisiana Tort Law at the
Crossroads, 48 TUL. L. REV. 1111, 1112 (1974). See, e.g., Adams v. Golson, 187 La. 363,
174 So. 876 (1937); Arrington v. Hearin Tank Lines, Inc., 80 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1955). But see Southern Air Transp. v. Gulf Airways, Inc., 215 La. 366, 40 So. 2d
787 (1949).
9. Cartwright v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 254 La. 330, 213 So. 2d 822 (1969); Samson v.
So. Bell Telephone and Telegraph, 205 So. 2d 496, 502 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Helgason
v. Hartford Ins. Co., 187 So. 2d 140, 143 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966); Lyons v. Jahncke Ser-
vice, Inc., 125 So. 2d 619, 627 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960). See Barham, A Renaissance of
the Civilian Tradition in Louisiana, 33 LA. L. REv. 357, 384 (1973).
10. A discussion of every case in this series is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, for the interested reader, the cases are as follows, in order of chronological
development: Dupre v. Travelers Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 98 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968); Cart-
wright v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 154, 156 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968) (Tate, J., con-
curring); Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971); Theriot v.
Transit Co., 263 La. 106, 267 So. 2d 211 (1972); Simon v. Ford Motor Co., 282 So. 2d at
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"fault" and transformed article 2317 from a mere introductory arti-
cle into one which provided for legal responsibility for things in
one's custody.
One of these cases, Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp.," marked a
significant departure from a negligence-restricted concept of fault
and toward a more inclusive concept of fault. Therein, the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the defendant had injured the plaintiff
through his "fault as analogized from the conduct required under
Civil Code Article 669 and others" and that "responsibility for the
damage attaches to defendants under Civil Code Article 2315."'12 The
court further noted that "proof of lack of negligence and lack of im-
prudence [would] not exculpate the defendant."'" Although the court
was not confronted with article 2317 in that case," the decision was
important to the development of article 2317 because of its recogni-
tion of a non-negligent type of fault. 5
The transformation of article 2317 from a transitional article into
one with autonomous substance culminated in the last case of the
series, Loescher v. Parr.1" In that case the plaintiff sought recovery
for the damage caused when the defendant's tree fell onto and de-
molished the plaintiff's automobile; the Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed the appellate court's denial of recovery. The appellate
court had based its denial on a lack of proof that defendant had
acted negligently. Following two of its previous decisions 7 decided
129-32, 136 (La. 1973) (Tate, J., dissenting) (Barham, J., dissenting) (Barham, J., dissen-
ting on rehearing); Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974); Turner v. Bucher, 308
So. 2d 270 (La. 1975); Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975). See generally, Tunc,
supra note 8; Comment, Does Louisiana Really Have Strict Liability Under Civil Code
Articles 2317, 2318, and 2321?, 40 LA. L. REV. 207 (1979); Note, The "Discovery" of Ar-
ticle 2317, 37 LA. L. REV. 234 (1976); Note, Introducing Strict Liability to Article 2317,
22 Loy. L. REV. 625 (1976); Note, Things in One's Custody-Louisiana Civil Code Arti-
cle 2317, 43 TUL. L. REV. 907 (1969).
11. 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
12. 258 La. at 1083, 249 So. 2d at 140.
13. Id.
14. The liability the court confronts in Langlois is liability for an ultrahazardous
activity. 258 La. at 1083, 249 So. 2d at 139. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 78, at 505.
This is to be contrasted with the relational responsibility liability involved in article
2317.
15. For the court's analysis on the expansion of fault beyond negligence, see 258
La. at 1074-84, 249 So. 2d at 136-40. If the court had not expanded fault beyond
negligence, article 2317 would have been restricted to only negligent fault on the part
of the custodian. See Barham, supra note 9, at 384.
16. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
17. In Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974), the Louisiana Supreme Court
held, on the basis of Louisiana Civil Code article 2321, that "[w]hen a domesticated
animal harms another, the master of the animal is presumed to be at fault." Id. at 119.
The court also added that "[tihe fault so provided is in the nature of strict liability .... "
Id The court also found legal fault, which it termed "legally imposed strict liability,"
[Vol. 411376
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under similar responsibility provisions, the Louisiana Supreme
Court found fault under article 2317, based not on negligence, but
rather on "legal fault." The legal fault developed by the court in
these three responsibility decisions is similar to strict liability 8 and
arises from the "legal relationship to the person or thing whose con-
duct or defect creates an unreasonable risk of injuries to others.""
Thus, after Loescher the requirement of fault in article 2315 can be
satisfied by the "legal fault" imposed upon the relationship under ar-
ticle 231720 without necessitating a finding of negligence on the part
of the owner or custodian.
However, this liability is not absolute in nature.2 2 There are
situations wherein a portion or all of the damage is attributable to a
cause other than the defendant's fault. Therefore, liability may be
avoided by a showing that the harm was caused by the fault of the
victim, by the fault of a third person, or by an irresistible force.23
on the part of the parent in Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270, 277 (La. 1975), for the
delictual acts of the child below the age of discernment on the basis of Louisiana Civil
Code article 2318.
18. 324 So. 2d at 447.
19. Id. at 446.
20. For a thorough discussion of the fault system that has developed and the prin-
ciples of legal fault, see id. at 445-48. In order to understand better the nature of legal
fault in the context of relational responsibility, it is important to understand why the
court chose to develop the legal fault concept. The court was influenced greatly by the
fact that nearly identical provisions had been interpreted in this manner by the French
and other civilian jurisdictions. Id at 447-48; Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113, 117-18
(La. 1974). Even more influential may have been certain policy considerations. The
court felt that the risk of harm should be placed upon the owner who kept the thing or
animal for his own pleasure or gain, rather than borne by an innocent third person.
Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 446 (La. 1975); Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La.
1975); Theriot v. Transit Cab Co., 263 La. 106, 267 So. 2d 211 (1972). The court also
decided that the limited liability which may have been justified in the days of the ex-
panding frontier was no longer appropriate for a crowded, urban, developed society.
Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113, 119 (La. 1974); Simon v. Ford Motor Co., 282 So. 2d
126, 130 (La. 1973) (Tate, J., dissenting). See Cartwright v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 213 So.
2d 154, 158 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968) (Tate, J., concurring). Although unarticulated as a
reason in these decisions, implicit in the finding of legal fault for things in one's
custody under article 2317 is the prevalence of liability insurance in contemporary
America, which permits risks to be spread through society at large. See Tate, The In-
terpretation of Written Rule of Law, 27 LA. B.J. 79, 82 (1979).
21. All that is required is that "the injured person must prove the vice (i.e.,
unreasonable risk of injury to another) in the person or thing whose act causes.the
damage, and that the damage resulted from this vice." Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d
441, 446-47 (La. 1975).
22. Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113, 119 n.10 (La. 1974). Cf Briley v. Mitchell,
238 La. 551, 115 So. 2d 851 (1959) (absolute liability imposed under article 2321 for
damages caused by wild animals).
23. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 447 (La. 1975); Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d
270, 277 (La. 1975); Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113, 119 (La. 1974). For a com-
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Focus in this discussion will be restricted primarily to the defense of
victim fault.
The term "victim fault" is one the court began using upon enter-
ing the legal fault area.' Before the legal fault cases, the court
classified the victim's contributory conduct by using specific doc-
trines (e.g., contributory negligence and assumption of the risk).
Various reasons may have prompted the court's choosing to use the
different and broader term, "victim fault." The court may have
followed the French use of the term. Since the court was influenced
greatly by the French authority when interpreting the responsibility
articles," it is logical to assume that the court also found the
defenses used by the French 6 persuasive. The court also may have
chosen the term because it is broad enough to encompass many
types of victim conduct.27
The limits of this defense in the strict liability area have not yet
been delineated fully.2" During the period in which Louisiana's judici-
ary developed the legal fault concept, the doctrine of contributory
negligence was used in negligence actions.' The use of the con-
parative and historical examination of the three defenses, see F. STONE, TORT DOc-
TRINE §§ 44-58 in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 57-81 (1977).
24. E.g., Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 447 (La. 1975); Turner v. Bucher, 308
So. 2d 270, 277 (La. 1975); Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113, 119 (La. 1974). See Com-
ment, Fault of the Victim: The Limits of Liability Under Civil Code Articles 2317,
2318 and 2321, 38 LA. L. REV. 995, 999 (1978).
25. See note 20, supra.
26. See F. STONE, supra, note 23, § 44, at 59.
27. See generally Comment, supra note 24, at 999-1000.
28. This discussion is confined to consideration of the victim fault defense when
the victim's conduct was negligent. Whether legal fault on the part of the victim will
serve as a defense is an interesting question, though outside the scope of this paper.
See Comment, supra note 24.
29. There is serious question as to whether the Louisiana courts should have used
the common law doctrine of contributory negligence. Provisions of the Louisiana Civil
Code, article 2315 and, prior to its recent repeal, article 2323, could have been inter-
preted to provide for a victim fault defense in the nature of comparative negligence.
Article 2315 states that "[elvery act whatever of man that causes damage to
another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." The author suggests that
the logical extension of this principle is that one is not obliged to pay that which did
not happen through his fault and that, therefore, liability should be reduced by the
amount attributable to the plaintiffs fault.
Article 2323, repealed by Act 431 of 1979, provided: "the damage caused is not
always estimated at the exact value of the thing destroyed or injured; it may be reduced
according to circumstances, if the owner of the thing has exposed it imprudently."
Many scholarly writers have urged that this article expressly provided a victim fault
defense in the nature of comparative negligence. See Malone, Comparative
Negligence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 LA. L. REV. 125 (1945); Comment, Com-
parative Negligence in Louisiana, 11 TUL. L. REV. 112 (1936); Note, Negligence-Last
Clear Chance-Apparent Peril- Comparative Negligence -Article 2323, Louisiana
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tributory negligence doctrine in negligence actions continued until
the recentpassage of the comparative negligence statute." Whether
contributory negligence is available as a form of victim fault in ac-
tions based on legal fault31 and whether the comparative negligence
statute is to be applied are uncertain. Since contributorily negligent
conduct is relatively commonplace in most situations that involve
legal fault, the issues of whether contributory negligence constitutes
victim fault and whether the comparative negligence statute should
apply are significant.
The court's treatment of the victim fault defense to date should
indicate what types of conduct will be considered victim fault in
strict liability actions. While the cases do not address directly the
defense of victim fault under article 2317, they do provide some in-
sight as to what the court will deem to bar recovery.
In Langlois, which involved strict liability for ultrahazardous ac-
tivities, the Louisiana Supreme Court found contributory negligence
not to be a defense.2 However, the court did comment that under
appropriate factual circumstances assumption of the risk would be a
defense.3 The only reason given by the court for not finding con-
tributory negligence applicable was that "[tihe defense of con-
Civil Code of 1870, 15 TUL. L. REV. 480 (1941). However, the Louisiana judiciary chose
to ignore article 2323. Vidrine v. Missouri Farm Ass'n., 339 So. 2d 877, 800 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1976); Inman v. Silver Fleet of Memphis, 175 So. 436, 438-39 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1937).
Instead of interpreting the Civil Code to provide for comparative negligence, the
Louisiana judiciary decided at an early stage to import the common law doctrine of
contributory negligence. It is interesting to note that the court cited directly an
English common law decision to sppport the use of contributory negligence and gave
no explanation as to why the common law doctrine should apply within a civilian
jurisdiction. Fleytas v. Ponchartrain R.R. Co., 18 La. 339 (1841).
30. 1979 La. Acts, No. 431, amending and reenacting LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2103,
2323 & 2324; & LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 1811 & 1917. It is perplexing that Louisiana con-
tinued to cling to the common law defense of contributory negligence in the face of the
growth of comparative negligence in other civilian jurisdictions. See Malone, supra
note 29, at 130 (those listed include France, Puerto Rico, the Phillipine Islands, and
Germany). Moreover, it is anomalous that Louisiana utilized the doctrine after it was
abandoned in England, see Law Reform, Contributory Negligence, Act of 1945, 8 & 9
Geo. VI c. 28, and in various American jurisdictions as well. See note 40, infra.
Perhaps the contributory negligence doctrine had become so entrenched in Louisiana
law that the judiciary felt that it was not within the scope of its role to change from
the established defense, even though the doctrine was judicially created. See F. STONE,
supra note 23, § 54, at 74.
31. The Louisiana Supreme Court has yet to deal directly with this defense, and
the appellate decisions are unclear. See Rodrigue v. Dixilyn, 620 F.2d 537, 542-43 (5th
Cir. 1980). But see Sullivan v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 382 So. 2d 184, 189 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1980).
32. Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La, 1067, 1086, 249 So. 2d 133, 140 (1971).
33. 258 La. at 1086-89, 249 So. 2d at 140-41.
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tributory negligence ... urged here presupposes original negligence
on the part of the defendant," while "[tihis case is not a case where
negligence is an ingredient of fault.' 'u It seems that the court could
have provided a more penetrating analysis of why another type of
fault, negligence, was not to be considered. It is submitted that the
court took its approach to avoid the harshness of the total bar to
recovery which accompanies the contributory negligence defense.
However, the decision may illustrate the Louisiana court's attitude
toward contributory negligence in strict liability cases.
The court in Loescher v. Parr faced the irresistible force
defense to a strict liability action under article 2317,1 but force suffi-
cient to bar recovery was not presented. The court said that such an
intervening force must be "an event which happens from an ir-
resistible cause or force not foreseeable, usually a vis major or act
occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature without the con-
tribution by legal fault of any human."86 While the defenses of fault
of the victim and irresistible force are distinguishable, the court in
Loescher gives an indication of the high degree to which the in-
tervening force, whether it be an irresistible force, victim fault, or
third party fault, must cause damage to exculpate defendants.I
A sole cause approach to intervening cause was posited by the
court in Olsen v. Shell Oil Company,87 which dealt with the defense
of fault of a third person in a strict liability action under article
2322. There the court said:
The fault of a "third person" which exonerates a person
from his own obligation importing strict liability as imposed by
articles 2317, 2321, and 2322 is that which is the sole cause of
the damage, of the nature of an irresistible and unforseeable oc-
currence-i.e., where the damage resulting has no causal rela-
tionship whatsoever to the fault of the owner in failing to keep
his building in repair .... ..
Thus, the treatment of the fault of a third party defense, like the in-
tervening force defense, if analogous to victim fault, would seem to
indicate that only conduct so blatant as to seem a sole cause would
qualify as victim fault.
The issue of contributory negligence as victim fault in strict
liability actions under the responsibility articles has not been
34. 258 La. at 1086, 249 So. 2d at 140.
35. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 449 (La. 1975).
36. Id
37. 365 So. 2d 1285 (1979).
38. Id at 1293.
1380 [Vol. 41
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treated directly by the Louisiana Supreme Court. However, it seems
that if the principle established in other cases is applied to victim
fault, the conduct must be such that it would be virtually the sole
cause of the damage.
The last development that should be discussed in a preliminary
examination of victim fault is Louisiana's recent legislative adoption
of comparative negligence." Louisiana followed the lead of many
other states' and civilian jurisdictions 1 by enacting a comparative
negligence statute which went into effect August 1, 1980. Whether
it will be applied by Louisiana courts to strict liability/responsibility
actions remains to be seen. The wording of the statute lends itself
to the possibility of either finding. The pertinent article provides:
When contributory negligence is applicable to a claim for
damages, its effect shall be as follows: If a person suffers injury,
39. 1979 La. Acts No. 431, amending and reenacting LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2103,
2323 & 2324; & LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 1811 & 1917. See generally Chamallas, Com-
parative Fault and Multiple Party Litigation in Louisiana: A Sampling of the Prob-
lems, 40 LA. L. REV. 373 (1980); Johnson, Comparative Negligence and the Duty/Risk
Analysis, 40 LA. L. REV. 319 (1980); Malone, Prologue (Symposium: Comparative
Negligence in Louisiana), 40 LA. L. REV. 293 (1980); Pearson, Apportionment of Losses
Under Comparative Fault Laws-An Analysis of the Alternatives, 40 LA. L. REV. 343
(1980); Plant, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 40 LA. L. REV. 403
(1980); Wade, Comparative Negligence-Its Development in the United States and Its
Present Status in Louisiana, 40 LA. L. REV. 299 (1980); Comment, Prescribing Solidar-
ity: Contributing to the Indemity Dilemma, 41 LA. L. REV. 659 (1981).
40. Thirty-five states may be classified as comparative negligence states. See
Kaatz v. Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alas. 1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763-65 (1975); Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572(h) (West 1979) (general);
1979 CONN. LEGIS. SERV., PUB. ACT No. 79-483, § 4 (West 1979) (products liability); Hoff-
man v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 66-402, 94-703, 105-603
(1979); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-801 to -806 (1979); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 60-258a to -258b (1976); 1979 La. Acts, No. 431; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §
156 (1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (Law. Co-op. 1978); Placek v. City of
Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 604.02
(West 1978); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. §, 27-1-702 (1978); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41-141 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
507:7-a (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to -5.3 (West 1973); N.Y. ICIv. PRAC.] LAW §
1411 (McKinney 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§
11-12 (West 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 18-470 (1977); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7102
(1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-20-4 to -4.1 (1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1978);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to -43
(1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.010 (1979);
Bradley v, Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
895.045 (West 1979); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (1977). See also United States v.
Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975) (admiralty); 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1976) (FELA); 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1976) (Jones Act); 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1976) (Death on the High Seas Act).
41. See note 30, supra.
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death or loss as the result partly of his own negligence and partly
as a result of the fault of another person or persons, the claim
for damages shall not thereby be defeated, but the amount of
damages recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the de-
gree or percentage of negligence attributable to the person suf-
fering the injury, death or loss.4
Thus, the controlling issue is whether contributory negligence is ap-
plicable to a claim for damages based on legal fault. Under the
Langlois approach,'3 comparative negligence would not be used,
because contributory negligence is not applicable. Also, under the
"sole cause" approach used in Loescher" and Olsen'5 requiring that
the victim conduct constitute the sole cause of the injury, con-
tributory negligence would be inapplicable unless it constituted the
sole cause of the injury. However, the language of the article in
light of the total concept of fault suggests that the intent of the
legislature in using the wording, "as the result partly of his own
negligence and partly as a result of the fault of another person or
persons,"'" was to apply this article to legal fault situations, as well
as to negligent fault. Supportive of the application of comparative
negligence in the strict liability area is the fact that other civilian
jurisdictions, most notably France,'7 and other states,'8 have applied
comparative negligence to strict liability.
In Rodrigue the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit faced the
question of whether contributory negligence constituted victim fault
exculpating the defendant in a 2317 action. 9 Judge Tate, writing for
42. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2323 (emphasis added).
43. See notes 32-34, supra, and accompanying text.
44. See notes 35-36, supra, and accompanying text.
45. See notes 37-38, supra, and accompanying text.
46. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2323.
47. See generally F. STONE, supra note 23, §§ 48-49, at 69-71.
48. Three states which adopted comparative negligence judicially also extended it
judicially to apply to strict liability actions in the products liability context. Butaud v.
Suburban Marine & Sport. Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alas. 1976); Daly v. General
Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978); West v. Cater-
pillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So. 2d 80, 89-90 (Fla. 1976). At least five states have
adopted comparative fault statutes which, in their language, are not limited to
negligence actions. See ARK. REV. STAT. §§ 27-1763-65 (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 156 (1965); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1917); N.Y. [CIv. PRAC.] LAW art. 14A, §
1411 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (1971). At least three jurisdictions have applied
comparative negligence statutes to strict liability actions, despite language arguably
limiting the statute's application to negligence. Sun Val, Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-
Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 602-03 (D. Idaho 1976); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools
Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676, 681-83 (D.N.H. 1972); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155
N.W.2d 55, 64 (1967).
49. 620 F.2d 537, 539 (5th Cir. 1980).
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the court, held that contributory negligence was not a defense,"0 but
commented that assumption of the risk will constitute victim fault
when the facts justify a finding that a plaintiff has knowingly and
voluntarily assumed the risk.51
Since the Louisiana Supreme Court had never dealt directly
with the victim fault defense in the strict liability responsibility con-
text, Judge Tate resorted to analogizing from the court's treatment
of the other two defenses in Loescher and Olsen." He reasoned that
in order to be consistent with the criteria stated for the other two
defenses, "the victim's fault should be in the nature of an indepen-
dent and superseding cause of his damages."' Thus, in applying the
criteria of the other defenses, contributory negligence was judged
not to be a defense because contributorily negligent conduct is not
sufficient to be an independent, superseding cause. Judge Tate
found further support for rejecting contributory negligence in the
language used by the Langlois court. He declared that this "reason-
ing [was] clearly applicable to all strict liability theories."'" Addi-
tional support was found both in scholarly authority5 and in the
recognized law of some other American jurisdictions." Both sources
support the rule that a strict liability action is not barred by the
plaintiff's ordinary negligence.
Judge Tate was careful to note that the accident which was the
source of the Rodrigue litigation occurred before the comparative
negligence statute went into effect and that, therefore, the issue of
the statute's applicability to strict liability claims was not before the
court." However, he did comment that the adoption of comparative
50. Id. at 544.
51. Id. at 539. In dicta, the court seems to assume that assumption of the risk is a
defense. However, if one accepts the criteria used by the courts, it is conceivable that
in some situations, even if the plaintiff has knowingly and voluntarily encountered the
risk, the risk will still be imputable to the defendant, and hence assumption of the risk
will not be a defense.
52. Id. at 542.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 542-44. The court found Professor Stone's work very supportive. See F.
STONE, supra note 23, § 50, at 71. The basic theme of the cited statements is that con-
tributory negligence is properly pleaded only to an action based on negligence. The
main support for this proposition is in section 50 wherein the author cites two cases.
The first case, Steinmetz v. Kelley, 72 Ind. 552, 37 Am. Rep. 170 (Ind. 1880), is
distinguishable from the strict liability area in that it involves an intentional tort,
assault and battery (one is traditionally under no duty to retreat). The second case
referred to was Langlois v. Allied Chem Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971). See
notes 32-34, supra.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment N. (1965).
57. 620 F.2d at 544 n.11.
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negligence in other states had resulted in reevaluation of the tradi-
tional rule that contributory negligence did not affect the strict
liability plaintiffs recovery; he noted "[a] trend toward allowing
such conduct to reduce recovery . ... "I'
It is submitted that the court in Rodrigue was incorrect in its
exclusion of contributory negligence from victim fault under article
2317. There is no significant reason why contributory negligence
should be allowed as a defense in negligence fault actions and yet be
denied as a defense in legal 'fault actions. This distinction involves
the illogical position that the fault of the victim will relieve the
defendant of liability when he is negligent, but not when his liability
is based on legal fault.59 This distinction seems especially inconsis-
tent with the broad concept of fault Louisiana has developed. If dif-
ferent types of fault invoke liability, it is logical that they should
also be considered to relieve liability as well. The court in Rodrigue
attempts to justify its position by turning to the court's language in
Langlois and by trying to interpret the victim fault defense to be
consistent with the prior jurisprudence of the other defenses. How-
ever, neither approach really justifies the distinction in defenses
available under the two types of fault.
The court in Langlois merely stated that in that case negligence
was not "an ingredient of fault" and concluded that "contributory
negligence [was] not a defense.""0 This does not explain why the
same court that had just expanded the concept of fault beyond negli-
gence now was limiting fault as regards defenses. The court seems
to argue that contributory negligence is only relevant in actions based
on negligent fault, reiterating an old common law rule of ques-
tionable continued validity." Not only does the court's position ig-
58. Id
59. In Parker v. Hanks, 345 So. 2d 194, 199 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), a third circuit
decision involving article 2321 (owner's responsibility for the damage caused by his
animal), the court said that the victim fault defense should be given a "reasonable and
common-sense construction." The court also pointed out that "if the victim should be
barred from recovery in a negligence dog-bite," there was "no reason why the same
bar should not be applied in a case where the fault of the owner is non-negligent
fault." Id The same reasoning was used by the first circuit in Sullivan v. Gulf States
Utilities, 382 So. 2d 184, 189 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980), a case involving article 2317,
which noted that "[iut would be ironic ... for the defendant to be able to escape liabil-
ity in a negligence action because of the plaintiffs contributory negligence, yet be held
liable under a strict liability theory when the plaintiff has been equally at fault in
bringing about the harm."
60. 258 La. 1067, 1086, 249 So. 2d 133, 140 (1971).
61. The position that negligence cannot be examined in strict liability actions,
because square pegs do not fit into round holes, has been rejected in the recent ap-




nore the fact that fault is still involved, but also as one scholar com-
mented, contributory negligence is not best termed negligence, be-
cause the traditional duty owed to another is not present, but is bet-
ter termed "contributory fault." 2 Langlois also can be distinguished,
because it involves nonnegligent fault for ultrahazardous activities,
rather than the legal fault based upon relational responsibility.
Thus, Langlois provides little guidance as to why contributory negli-
gence is inapplicable."' The sole cause standard articulated in
Loescher and Olsen does not provide much assistance either. These
decisions do not support the proposition that contributory negli-
gence, which is a defense in neligence actions, is not victim fault in
legal fault/strict liability actions.
Third-party fault cannot be analogized to victim fault in strict
liability actions." In Sullivan v. Gulf State Utilities,65 a first circuit
decision addressing circumstances nearly identical to those in Rod-
rigue, the court considered the Olsen analogy and replied that "It/he
Supreme Court in Olsen made no indication that it was speaking of
victim fault when it held that third party fault must be the sole
cause of an accident in order to relieve an owner of liability .. .,,"
The first circuit noted further that "[ilf anything victim fault is more
closely analogous to contributory negligence than it is to third party
fault under the strict liability articles . , The two defenses,
third party fault and victim fault, can be distinguished readily ac-
cording to their natures. In situations involving third-party fault,
the plaintiff is an innocent party, and the issue is who will bear the
liability. Assuming that both parties' actions are causative and that
they would otherwise both be liable, it is logical to require a show-
ing from the defendant that the third party's actions were the sole
cause of the damages in order for the defendant to relieve himself of
liability and to shift it to the third party." A different situation
62. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 65, at 418-19.
63. It has been suggested that the Langlois decision does not apply to the
availability of the contributory negligence defense in strict liability responsibility
situations because later decisions mention victim fault as a defense. An example is the
language in Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113, 119 (1974), listing victim fault as a
defense under article 2321. See Parker v. Hanks, 345 So. 2d 194, 198 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1977).
64. Sullivan v. Gulf States Utilities, 382 So. 2d 184, 189 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
65. 382 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
66. Id. at 189.
67. d. The court also found, for purposes of the case before them, "the measure
of conduct necessary to achieve the appellation 'contributory negligence"' to be "the
same measure necessary to amount to 'victim fault' under 2317." Id. at 190.
68. Requiring less than a showing of sole cause would enhance the possibility that
each party could argue successfully the fault of the other as a defense and leave the in-
nocent plaintiff with no one from whom to recover. Another possible justification for
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arises when the plaintiff has contributed to his own damages and
yet, under the sole cause approach, would be able to recover unless
the defendant could meet the difficult burden of showing that the
plaintiff's actions were the sole cause of his damage.
Analogizing the irresistible force defense to victim fault is also
questionable. One important distinction is that in the case of an ir-
resistible force defense, an innocent plaintiff is being denied re-
covery for damage he has suffered; thus, it may be desirable to pro-
vide him with greater protection before denying recovery. When
victim fault is urged as a defense, the plaintiff has contributed to his
damage.
There may be certain policy reasons which may have been im-
plicitly considered in Rodrigue. One may be the potential for un-
fairness when recovery is denied totally. However, this potential un-
fairness is not unique to strict liability actions, but was present in
negligence actions when Rodrigue was decided, and thus provides
no reason for differential treatment. Another reason may be that
allowing a defendant to escape all liability would be inconsistent
with the desire expressed in Loescher to hold people responsible for
the harm caused by things under their control. 9 However, the policy
underlying Loescher was that, as between two innocent parties, the
owner or guardian of a thing should pay for any damage it causes.
This consideration evaporates when the victim is negligent, rather
than innocent."0
Thus, in light of the then-existing law, the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence still in effect in negligence actions, con-
tributory negligence should have been considered as victim fault
under article 2317 by the Rodrigue court. However, an unanswered
question is whether the comparative negligence statute would apply
under those circumstances.71
The comparative negligence statute is ambiguous because it pur-
ports to apply: "When contributory negligence is applicable to a
requiring the defendant to meet a greater burden and for providing the plaintiff with
more protection is that, as a practical matter, it may be impossible for the plaintiff to
recover from the third party under certain circumstances, e.g., insolvency of the third
party.
69. See note 20, supra.
70. Sullivan v. Gulf States Utilities, 382 So. 2d 184, 189-90 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
71. It is important to note that this question, at least as treated by Judge Tate, is
unanswered, regardless of whether contributory negligence is applicable in that case.
This implies that there may be a difference in the applicability of contributory
negligence under a comparative negligence system. See generally Rodrigue v. Dixilyn,
620 F.2d 537, 544 n.ll (5th Cir. 1980).
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claim for damages . . . ."" The question is whether contributory
negligence is applicable to a claim for damages in a strict liability
action. In light of the previous discussion, three possible statutory
constructions are available to resolve the issue.
First, one might argue that at the time the statute was passed,
the view accepted by the courts was that the defense of contribu-
tory negligence was not available in strict liability actions and,
therefore, that the comparative negligence statute is not operative. 3
This view could be supported by the decision of Langlois and the
persuasive reasoning of Rodrigue.
Second, one might contend that the defense of victim fault,
posited by the Louisiana Supreme Court as a defense to strict liabil-
ity, does encompass contributory negligence and thus that the com-
parative negligence statute is operative. This position is viable, as
pointed out in the above discussion of Rodrigue, since the distinction
between the two types of fault for purposes of the victim fault de-
fense is both illogical and lacking in support.
A third approach is to distinguish the role of contributory negli-
gence in an "all or nothing" system from its function in a reduced
recovery system." Earlier case law developed under the "all or
nothing" system, which resulted in addressing whether the
plaintiffs conduct was an independent, superseding cause. On the
other hand, the comparative negligence reduced recovery system is
by its nature designed to consider conduct which falls short of con-
stituting an independent and superseding cause. Reduced recovery,
as opposed to a total bar, enables courts to consider contributory
conduct which is less than the sole cause without frustrating re-
covery completely. This approach reasons that even if contributory
negligence was not applicable under prior case law, it is applicable
to a claim for damages under the comparative negligence statute. In
addition to the validity of its reasoning, this approach seems to be
desirable because it avoids the conflict caused by the lack of ab-
solute clarity as to whether contributory negligence was a defense
in the strict liability/responsibility area. Thus, following either of
these two constructions, the statute should be interpreted to
operate.
72. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2323.
73. It could be argued that even if the comparative negligence statute were found
inapplicable in legal fault actions, comparative negligence would be applied on the
basis of 2315. See note 29, supra. However, a possible counter-argument is that if the
legislature expressly provided for comparative negligence in negligence actions only,
the legislative intent,was to exclude the application of comparative negligence in legal
fault actions.
74. See Wade, supra note 39, at 313.
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Close examination of the wording of the statute reinforces the
contention that it applies in cases based on strict liability. The word-
ing: "injury, death or loss as the result partly of his own negligence
and partly as a result of the fault of another person or persons,"7
contemplates balancing the negligence (contributory negligence) of
the plaintiff and the fault (including legal fault) of the defendant."6
Thus, while the first sentence of the statute is ambiguous, subse-
quent statutory language indicates that comparative negligence is
applicable in strict liability responsibility actions.
Both the statute, when considered by itself, and its interpreta-
tion in light of the whole fault system seem to demand such a result.
The underlying rule in this system is that a person is liable for
damage caused by his fault. Therefore, he should not be liable for
that damage which his fault did not cause; nor should a plaintiff
recover for injury his own fault produced.77 This principle is as valid
in the context of legal fault as in the setting of negligent fault.
The application of comparative negligence not only is more
desirable theoretically, but also is the most fair approach. The ap-
plication of the statute would avoid the unfair result which would
occur if a negligent defendant is liable for a reduced amount while a
defendant who may have exercised the utmost care, but who was
guilty of legal fault, is liable for the entire loss. This fairness will
not thwart the policy of holding a person liable for the damage caused
by things in his custody, because he still will be responsible for the
damage the thing did cause (but not the damage caused by the vic-
tim himself).
Many other civilian jurisdictions and states have faced this prob-
lem and have chosen to apply comparative negligence to strict liabil-
ity, and their experience is relevant to the question of applicability
in Louisiana. In other states the substitution of comparative negli-
gence for the "total bar" system was soon extended to apply to
strict liability as well. The application of comparative negligence to
strict liability should be even easier in Louisiana, with its generalized
concept of fault, than in the common law jurisdictions of other
states.
Thus, in light of these considerations, the correct result seems
to be the operation of the comparative negligence statute in actions
based on legal fault. Therefore, it is important that the holding of
75. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323.
76. See Plant, supra note 39, at 413.
77. The principle is implicit in article 2315, was expressed in the 1870 version of
article 2323, and is the basis for the current article 2323.
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Rodrigue, that contributory negligence is not a defense to strict
liability actions in Louisiana, is not followed in Louisiana's future
jurisprudence.
Thomas G. Smart
WHAT'S IN A NAME? - LOUISIANA'S "PROTECTION" OF TRADENAMES:
Elle, Ltd. v. Elle Est
The plaintiff, Elle, Ltd., a Louisiana corporation' engaged in the
sale of women's clothing, claimed violations of the principles of
unfair competition and tradename infringement.' The plaintiff
sought to enjoin the defendant,3 a nearby clothing store, from using
the word "elle" in its tradename. The Civil District Court for the
Parish of Orleans, while criticizing its own decision,' adhered to
precedent 5 and denied injunctive relief. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court decision and held that the word
"elle" was a common noun and as such could not be protected by
injunction absent a showing of the defendant's fraudulent intent.
Elle, Ltd. v. Elle Est, 388 So. 2d 1166 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
A tradename is a word, name, or symbol used to distinguish one
business from another.' The federal government and some states, in-
cluding Louisiana, allow by statute the reservation of tradenames.'
1. Elle, Ltd. was incorporated on May 17, 1977, in Book 318 of the Secretary of
State of the State of Louisiana.
2. The name "Elie, Ltd." was trademarked in June, 1977, pursuant to the re-
quirements of LA. R.S. 51:212-18 (Supp. 1968).
3. Elle Est reserved its tradename on June 25, 1979.
4. No. 79-12656 (D. La. Oct. 17, 1979). Judge Plotkin felt that the jurisprudence
was clear, Straus Frank Co. v. Brown, 246 La. 999, 1007, 169 So. 2d 77, 80 (1964), that
in Louisiana, a plaintiff must establish the defendant's fraudulent intent in order to
obtain an injunction. However, he suggested that the supreme court reconsider the
standards set forth in Straus and adopt the more reasonable approach of allowing in-
junctive relief upon a showing of public confusion.
5. Louisiana courts consistently have held that the prerequisite for granting
relief to the plaintiff is proof of fraud on the part of the defendant. The reigning case
in this area is Straus Frank Co. v. Brown, 246 La. 999, 1007, 169 So. 2d 77, 80 (1964).
6. Tradenames are to be distinguished from trademarks in that the latter are
used to identify goods made or sold by the owner. See LA. R.S. 51:211(A)&(D) (Supp.
1968).
7. The federal treatment of trademarks and tradenames may be found in what is
generally called the "Lanham Act." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976).
Louisiana allows reservation of tradenames (ie., registration with the Secretary of
State) under trademark law and corporate law. See LA. R.S. 51:213 (Supp. 1968); 12:23
(Supp. 1968).
